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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we survey the UK-based literature on school structures and school autonomy to 
identify settings in which alternative and more autonomous school arrangements can improve 
the educational attainments of pupils in the bottom tail of the achievement distribution. We 
also present new evidence on the effect of school academies on the age-16 GCSE attainment 
of students of different abilities up to 2009, before the Coalition Government changed the 
nature of the Labour academy programme. Within the UK education system, academies enjoy 
substantial autonomy in terms of management of their staff, taught curriculum, length of the 
school day and other aspects of their day-to-day functioning. Our results show that schools 
that converted to academies between 2002 and 2007 improved their overall age-16 GCSEs 
results by further raising the attainments of students in the top half of the ability distribution, 
and in particular pupils in the top 20% tail. Conversely, we find little evidence that academies 
helped pupils in the bottom 10% and 20% of the ability distribution. Finally, we find little 
evidence that late converters (2008 and 2009) had any beneficial effects on pupils of any 
ability. We conclude our research by comparing the experience of UK academies to that of 
US charter schools and Swedish free schools, and by providing some insights into the reasons 
why UK academies did not serve ‘the tail’ as is the case for some US charter schools. 
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School Structure, School Autonomy 
and the Tail
Stephen Machin
 
and Olmo Silva 
Introduction 
The idea that different school structures and degrees of autonomy can improve standards is one that 
has become popular in some quarters. What is more, some of the newer school structures – like 
academy schools in England, charter schools in America, and free schools in Sweden – often have a 
preponderance of ‘tail’ students. Thus it is natural to ask whether there is scope for different school 
structures – and the differing degrees of autonomy associated with them – to alleviate the tail by 
raising standards. 
These issues form the focus of this Chapter, where we ask what can be said about this extremely 
important aspect of education policy by looking at the most convincing and up-to-date research 
evidence. We try to identify situations where evidence points to a beneficial impact on pupils in the 
tail of the achievement distribution, and assess whether we can find scope for these alternative 
institutional arrangements to work in English schools. In doing so, we will revise both the theoretical 
arguments and the empirical evidence on the effects of alternative school arrangements and autonomy 
on students in the tail of the ability distribution. To begin with, we will discuss why more autonomous 
school structures could have an impact on students’ attainment and school composition. We will then 
discuss in more detail the nature of school structures in England, and place academies in this context. 
We will finally review some related empirical evidence coming from the UK, the US and Sweden. 
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School autonomy and alternative school structures: Why should they work? 
Partly motivated by the inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of resource-based interventions 
(Hanushek, 2003), governments around the world tend to favour policies based on accountability, 
autonomous school structures, and choice in the ‘schooling market’ to improve standards. The 
rationale for this focus rests with the idea that more autonomy and flexibility in school arrangements, 
coupled with quasi-market incentives, can spur teaching innovation and address low achievements. 
But what are the main ‘ingredients’ of models of education centred on autonomy and choice?  
Accountability lies at the heart of these modes of schooling provision. In these settings, pupils 
are assessed on the basis of standardised examinations and this allows parents and policy makers to 
identify good and bad schools, impose sanctions and targets, and undertake closure and restructuring. 
Crucially, within an accountability framework, standardised tests are made publicly available via 
league tables to all potentially interested ‘stake-holders’, i.e. parents, practitioners and government 
analysts. This implies that schools are not only accountable to the local governments or other funding 
bodies – e.g. the ‘sponsor’ in the case of some of the English academies – but more widely and 
directly to parents, who can ‘shop around’ for school quality (Tiebout, 1956). All in all, the scope of 
accountability is to gather and spread information about school achievements and to allow monitoring 
of education progress and teaching staff performance.  
Accountability by itself may provide sufficient incentives for schools to improve performance. 
This could occur because of ‘name-and-shame’ mechanisms, or through specifically targeted 
interventions aimed at addressing problems identified by the gathering of information. Accountability 
might also raise teacher and pupil motivation, and increase parental involvement in their child’s 
education. However, it is generally argued that accountability will produce most of its effects when 
coupled with mechanisms that: (1) increase parental choice; and (2) grant schools some autonomy to 
restructure their governance and respond to the competitive pressures introduced by parental choice.
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Why should school choice and autonomy spur better educational standards? Arguments in 
support of these positive effects use standard efficiency explanations from economic theory that 
broadly fall into two categories: (1) those based on the better matching of pupil needs and school 
provision; and (2) those based on market discipline incentives. The first argument suggests that gains 
arise through the efficient allocation of pupils to schools according to personal tastes and pedagogic 
needs. If schools are allowed some autonomy to differentiate, then pupils can choose the education-
service provider that better caters for their needs. This more efficient ‘matching’ of pupils and schools 
will lead to higher academic achievements. The second argument is based on competition among 
schools and market-type incentives. If parents are given freedom to choose the school that they prefer, 
good schools will attract more students and will expand, whereas bad schools will lose pupils and 
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LeGrand (1991, 1993), Machin and Vignoles (2005) and Burgess et al. (2006) present a discussion of the 
English school choice experience, while Hoxby (2004) gives a detailed analysis of the topic for the US. 
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eventually close. In order to remain in the market and keep up with their competitors, schools will 
have to monitor and improve teaching practices, thus raising educational attainments. 
Notice that some important assumptions underlie this model of school provision. First, schools 
are able to signal their overall quality to parents via information provided in performance tables, and 
this drives enrolment patterns. Second, resources follow pupils – so that pupils are valuable ‘assets’ 
for schools – and funding is linked to schools’ capacity to attract students. Third, schools are granted 
some flexibility to experiment with different teaching methods and to specialise so that they can cater 
for specific needs or tastes. Schools should also be given some autonomy to manage their teaching 
body in ways that improve performance and motivation, and to use personnel practices that facilitate 
the hiring and retaining of talented instructors and managers. Finally, good schools should be allowed 
to expand in order to accommodate extra demand for their services, and new schools should be 
allowed in the market if there is demand for their activities. On the other hand, underperforming 
schools should be allowed to fail and close. 
Although models of school provision centred on autonomous structures and choice could deliver 
improvements in standards, a number of drawbacks have been highlighted. For example, schools 
could respond to an increase in competition by reducing their teaching effort and going ‘down-
market’ in order to serve only parents with weak preferences for school quality. Moreover, pupil 
might travel further distances to attend the school of their choice with consequent detrimental effects 
on achievement because of lateness, fatigue or absence.  
However, the most overarching concerns relate to distributional issues. First of all, although 
wider school choice could boost some pupils’ achievements, these benefits may come at the cost of 
increased between-school segregation and the gains may not be equally distributed, i.e. school 
autonomy and choice might not be a ‘tide to lift all boats’. The argument behind this claim is two-
fold. On the one hand, better-off parents might be more effective at exploiting school choice – e.g. 
because of awareness of educational opportunities and familiarity with the education system – and 
gain access to high-quality education, while segregating students with the most disadvantaged 
backgrounds into ‘sink-schools’. On the other hand, when standardised exams (feeding into league 
tables) are high-stakes because they determine reputation and student roll, school have incentives to 
cherry-pick students with the ‘right’ background (a practice called ‘cream-skimming’). 
A related worry is that – even if school do admit disadvantaged pupils – they might try to ‘game’ 
or ‘twist’ the system. For example, teachers might coach only students that are most likely to perform 
well in standardised tests and neglect pupils at the bottom of the ability distribution in order maximise 
school ratings. Similarly, schools might exempt more poor-performing students from sitting exams 
when facing short-run incentives to improve performance, or place more students from low socio-
economic backgrounds into special education needs to mitigate their adverse impact on the league 
tables. Finally, it has been argued that that autonomy coupled with accountability based on league 
tables might push teachers to train students only to perform well in standardised tests, a problem often 
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referred to as teaching-to-the-test. It is however worth noting that the theoretical considerations in 
Lazear (2006) suggest that teaching-to-the-test might be more ‘efficient’ – i.e. produce more learning 
– when there are disproportionately many high-cost learners in the class. In this sense, predictable
high-stakes tests which can be drilled by the teachers might favour students in the tail, who would 
otherwise leave school even without this basic level of learning. 
School structures in the English system and academies in context 
Secondary schools in the state-sector in England fall into a number of categories that differ in terms of 
their governance, management of the teaching staff and control over pupil admissions. Currently, 
secondary schools can take one of the following six alternative structures: community schools, 
voluntary controlled schools, foundation schools, voluntary aided schools, city technology colleges, 
and – since their introduction in the early 2000s – academy schools. In the next paragraphs, we briefly 
discuss how these school types are structured and highlight their autonomy – or lack of it – in terms of 
governance and admissions. This will set the ground for a discussion of school academies, which 
enjoy the most autonomous structures within the state-school system.
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Starting with community schools, these institutions are mainly organized and managed through 
the local education authority (LEA) and their governing body is predominantly composed by 
members of the staff and representative of the LEA. Responsibility for recruiting, human resources 
decisions and admissions is in the hands of the LEA. As a result, these schools are characterised by 
very little autonomy and tend to admit local students or students who are assigned to the school by the 
LEA if they cannot be accommodated in the school of their choice.
3
 Next, voluntary controlled 
schools are similar to community schools in that admissions and employment decisions solidly rest in 
the hands of the LEA. However, the majority of these schools is religiously denominated and 
associated to one of the main faiths (mainly Church of England). As a consequence, their governing 
body also includes members of the foundation supporting the school.  
Voluntary-aided and foundation schools enjoy more autonomy than voluntary controlled and 
community schools and are similarly structured, except for the fact that foundation schools are 
predominantly secular whereas voluntary aided schools are mainly religiously denominated (Catholic 
and Church of England). These schools are run as a partnership between the state and the voluntary 
sector, and the foundation (or the governing body of the school) is responsible for hiring and firing 
decisions, personnel management and admissions. Note also that the governing body of these schools 
has a smaller proportion of members of the LEA and a significant representation of members of the 
2
 The English secondary school market also includes a set of independent (private and fee paying) school. Their 
management body makes autonomous decisions in terms of hiring and firing of staff, the teaching content, 
structure and length of the school day, and the procedures for pupil selection and admissions. 
3
 Admission to schools is based on parental preference, but over-subscribed schools prioritise pupils on the basis 
of various school-specific criteria. For secular schools, priority is given to children with special educational 
needs, children with siblings in the school and to children who live closest. For Faith schools, regular attendance 
at local designated churches is foremost. More details are provided in Gibbons et al. (2008). 
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foundation. In particular, in voluntary aided schools, members appointed by the foundation cover at 
least 50% of the available seats.  
Similarly to these schools, city technology colleges (CTCs) also enjoy substantial autonomy 
from the LEA. In particular, the majority of their governing body is filled with representatives of the 
sponsor (usually a business, faith or voluntary group) and the school acts as its own admission 
authority. Moreover, the governing body of the school has substantial control over staffing decisions. 
However, CTCs follow the national curriculum and are characterised by a strong emphasis on 
technological, scientific and practical subjects. 
Lastly, academy schools enjoy a larger degree of autonomy than any other school type in the 
state system. Academies were gradually introduced into the English school system by the Labour 
Government starting from September 2002. Whilst there are differences in the nature of their 
introduction in different LEAs, the main aim of the Labour policy was to replace existing failing local 
schools through conversion to academies.
4
 Although academies remain part of the state sector and are 
non-selective, non-fee-charging state-funded schools, they broadly fall outside the control of the LEA 
in terms of key strategic decisions and day-to-day management. In fact, academies are managed by a 
private, independent sponsor through a largely self-appointed board of governors. This body has 
responsibility for hiring the staff, negotiating pay and working conditions, and deciding on matters 
such as career development, discipline and performance management. Furthermore, some academies 
(depending on their funding arrangements) enjoy more autonomy in terms of the majority of the 
taught curriculum (except for English, Maths, Science and IT), as well as of the structure and length 
of the school day. Finally, these schools can select up to 10% of their pupils with a clear aptitude in 
the academy’s chosen specialism. 
Note that with the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in 2010, 
the nature of academies has altered. Many of the new converter academies are not the kinds of 
disadvantaged institutions that were the typical type of converting school under the Labour-sponsored 
academies model. Moreover, since only two years have passed since the Academies Bill 2010 
changed the nature of academy schools (and newly introduced free schools), we will not discuss the 
experience and likely effects of the new wave of academies.
5
 We will instead confine our attention to 
the Labour Academies, i.e. those introduced up to the academic year 2008/9. By this date, there were 
130 academies operating, comprising approximately 4.5% of secondary schools.
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4
 Note that some academies were also introduced as new schools in some particular areas, or as a way of 
successful (mainly private, fee-charging) schools to expand their pupil intake. 
5
 As of July 1 2012, the number of open academies had expanded hugely to 1957. 
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 More details on the introduction and functioning of the Labour academies can be found in Machin and Wilson 
(2008), Machin and Vernoit (2011), Wilson (2011). 
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School structures and school autonomy: Evidence from England 
We will now discuss the UK evidence on the effects of school structure and autonomy on both pupils’ 
performance and school intake. When thinking about the impact of school autonomy, the most 
pertinent example is the one of academy schools. However, at present, very limited evidence has been 
collected on this relatively recent ‘policy experiment’. Therefore, we begin by reviewing more 
generally what we know about some closely related topics, namely the effects of accountability, other 
forms of school autonomy and choice in the ‘education market’.  
To begin with, a broad literature has investigated the effects of the education reforms of the late 
1980s which lead to the publication of performance tables in 1992 and the introduction of parental 
choice as the guiding principle for pupils’ assignment to schools (see Glennester, 1991). For example, 
Levacic (2004) reports that secondary school head-teachers respond to competitive pressures due to 
the introduction of performance tables, and Bradley et al. (2000) show that secondary schools that 
performed better than their neighbours attracted more pupils. More recently, Burgess et al. (2010) 
study the abolition of performance tables in Wales and find that reducing accountability significantly 
worsens school effectiveness.  
One very illustrative example based on the reforming experience of the late 1980s is Clark 
(2009). The author investigates whether secondary schools that were handed more autonomy 
following conversion to grant maintained (GM) status (roughly corresponding to foundation schools 
today) performed better than schools that did not convert. More specifically, the author exploits the 
fact that parents with children enrolled at the school had to vote on the decision to become GM, and 
compares the performance of ‘narrow winners’ to the performance of ‘narrow losers’ to identify the 
effects of autonomous structures. The author finds that becoming a GM school is associated with 
significant improvements in the proportion of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs at A*-C grades 
(or equivalent). Moreover, this advantage increases over time, with schools improving at an 
increasing rate after conversion to their more autonomous structure. The author also finds that student 
‘quality’ (i.e. pupil intake) improves in schools converting to GM status, suggesting that they might 
become more selective, or that parental preferences for these schools might change upon conversion. 
On the other hand, the author does not investigate whether the effects of more autonomy are 
heterogeneous according to students’ background, so that it is hard to say whether GM status 
improved learning of students in the tail.  
In a related piece, Gibbons and Silva (2011) study the effect of attending an autonomous school 
– i.e. a voluntary aided or a foundation school – during primary education for more recent years (i.e. 
mid-2000s). Their approach exploits access to information about pupils’ place of residence, previous 
academic records and future (secondary) school choice to control for factors that influence the 
propensity to attend an autonomous school. The authors’ results suggest that although more 
autonomous schools tend to admit pupils with educationally advantageous backgrounds, there are no 
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clear performance benefits from autonomous structures. The authors find that this is true irrespective 
of pupils’ background: students eligible for free meals, carrying special education needs and with low 
early test scores (age-7/Key Stage 1 achievements) in more autonomous schools finish primary 
education neither better nor worse than comparable students in LEA-controlled community schools. 
However, Gibbons et al. (2007) find that primary schools with autonomous governance respond to a 
greater degree of competition with other local schools by raising their pupils’ achievements: their 
students’ Key Stage 1-to-Key Stage 2 value-added improves by about 1.6 point for each additional 
competitors, or about 16-19 weeks of progress in one of the core subjects, i.e. English or mathematics. 
The authors also find that effect is somewhat larger for pupils from disadvantaged background – i.e. 
those eligible for free-school meals – although the data is ‘thin’ and inference less precise. This 
suggests that pupils in the tail might benefit from studying at more autonomous schools when these 
have to compete with other local institutions. On the other hand, the authors find no evidence that 
increased school competition improve standards for pupils in schools that fall more heavily under the 
control of the LEA (e.g. community schools). These patterns lend some support to the idea that 
increased parental choice can lead to an improvement in standards in education when coupled with a 
sufficient degree of school autonomy. Consistent results are also documented in Gibbons and Silva 
(2008) who investigate the effectiveness of secondary schools in more dense urban environments, 
where the most disadvantaged students –i.e. those in the tail – tend to live. The authors show that 
students attending more urban secondary schools perform better than those enrolled at more isolated 
rural institutions, and suggest that a likely explanation of their findings lies in greater school choice 
and competition in denser urban environments.  
As discussed above, the main concern with increased school autonomy and choice is that these 
arrangements might trigger perverse school behaviour, and in particular efforts to ‘game the system’ 
and ‘cream-skim’ the best students. Evidence on the first issue is fairly scant, even though Burgess et 
al. (2005) show results consistent with the idea that accountability and autonomy have diverted 
teachers’ attention away from low ability pupils towards students most likely to achieve high marks 
and improve school rankings. In contrast, more research effort has been directed at understanding the 
effects of choice and autonomy on segregation. Among others, Bradley et al. (2000), Bradley and 
Taylor (2002), Goldstein and Noden (2003), and Burgess et al. (2004) all suggest that increased 
parental choice and differentiated school-markets (i.e. different schools with different structures) are 
associated with more polarization in secondary schools. Gibbons and Silva (2006) analyse this issue at 
the primary school level and find that more school choice tends to exacerbate polarisation of primary 
schools by student attainment, although this effect is not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
Gorard et al. (2003) show that secondary schools became less socially segregated in the 1990s after 
the introduction of the market-oriented reforms during the late 1980s, and Burgess et al. (2010) find 
no evidence of reduced sorting in Welsh school after the abolition of performance tables in 2001. 
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Direct evidence on the effect of autonomous structures as embodied by the academy schools is 
much more limited. Two early studies were conducted by Machin and Wilson (2008) and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC, 2008). The former looked at possible improvements in the GCSE 
performance of academy schools relative to the achievement of a matched group of schools, and 
found modest and insignificant effects. Conversely, PWC (2008) compared the evolution of 
achievements in academies to the attainment in the national average, and found large and significant 
effects. However, as Machin and Wilson (2008) argue, comparing achievements at academies to the 
average national performance is very problematic and results by PWC (2008) should be interpreted 
with caution. Interestingly, both Machin and Wilson (2008) and the PWC (2008) agree that – back in 
2008 – it might have been too early to draw conclusions on the general effectiveness of academies. 
More recent evidence collected in Machin and Vernoit (2011) presents a rosier picture: the authors 
show that moving to a more autonomous school structure by converting to an academy generates 
improvement in terms of pupils’ performance at the end of secondary school. Importantly, the authors 
find that these results are stronger for academies that experienced the largest increase in their school 
autonomy (i.e. from community schools to academies) and only significant and sizeable for academies 
that opened earlier on (i.e. up to the academic year 2006/7). These early reformers experience 
improvements in the fraction of pupils obtaining 5 or more A*-C GCSEs of around 18% of a standard 
deviation, or approximately 3.5 percentage points from an average of 30%.  
Machin and Vernoit (2011) and Wilson (2011) study changes in the pupil intake composition of 
schools becoming academies. Both studies find that the Key Stage 2 scores of year-7 pupils entering 
academies significantly improved after conversion. Further, both papers document that this 
improvement occurred in ‘one shot’ as schools changed their status and that the jump was sizeable at 
approximately 1.5-3% improvement in average Key Stage 2 achievements. Wilson (2011) further 
documents that this average improvement was accompanied by a significant reduction of the standard 
deviation of the Key Stage 2 scores of the incoming cohorts of year-7 pupils at converting academies, 
implying that overall these schools reduced their intake of pupils from the lower tail of the ability 
distribution. Finally, the author documents that converting academies enrolled approximately 12.5% 
fewer pupils who are eligible for free school meals, reinforcing the impression that academies became 
more ‘exclusive’. It should however be noticed that – lacking information on parental preferences – 
neither study can tell apart whether changes occurred because of school admissions practices or 
changes in parental preferences for this type of more autonomous schools.  
One thing remarkably absent from these studies on the effects of academies is an investigation of 
whether any improvements in school performance occurred by ‘lifting’ pupils in the tail or by further 
pushing up students at the top of the ability distribution. Using the same data and approach as Machin 
and Vernoit (2011), we next turn to this question. In a nutshell, we investigate the Key Stage 4 
(GCSE) performance effects of academy conversion across the distribution of pupil prior attainment, 
whereas Machin and Vernoit (2011) only looked at average effects. For comparison, they found an 
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average improvement of 0.148 of a standard deviation in the fraction of pupils obtaining 5 or 
more A*-C GCSEs for early academy conversions, but could not reject a zero impact for later 
conversions. 
Figure 1 summarizes the findings from our new analysis, while the actual results from our 
statistical regression approach are presented in Appendix Table 1. In the top plot, pupils are ranked by 
their Key Stage 2 total score (percentile) within their secondary school (e.g. the bottom 10% at the 
school), whereas in the bottom plot they are ranked within the national distribution (e.g. the bottom 
10% nation-wide).
7
 This alternative ranking allows us to account for the possibility that pupils in the 
middle of the ability distribution at an academy school might still be in the tail nation-wide since 
academies enrol the most disadvantaged students. Our findings reveal that the positive average effect 
of early converters documented by Machin and Vernoit (2011) and reported in the first pair of bars 
arises from significant effects higher up the distribution of students’ early test scores. There are 
positive, statistically significant (represented by a full bar in the plots) effects in the 50
th
-to-80
th
 and 
top 20 percentiles of the within-school distribution. Similarly, there are positive and sizeable effects 
in the 25
th
-50
th
 and top 20 percentiles in the national distribution, and very large positive effects for 
pupils in the 50
th
-to-80
th
 percentile of the national distribution. Although these effects are not 
significant, they are clearly much larger than those for pupils at the bottom of the ability distribution. 
Indeed, irrespectively of whether we rank pupils by the school or national ability distribution, the 
effects of academy conversion are insignificantly different from zero – and possibly negative for later 
conversions – in the bottom 10% and 20% of the ability distribution, suggesting no beneficial effects 
on tail students in academies. 
What do we learn from other countries’ experiences? The case of US and
Sweden 
England is not the only country where reforms aimed at giving schools more autonomy and freedom 
to innovate have taken place. In the US, charter schools – a type of institution similar to academies 
with significant autonomy in terms of management and decision making – have spread across many 
states since their introduction in the 1990s. Similarly, a reform implemented in Sweden in 1992 
brought to the ‘education market’ free-schools – i.e. private schools competing with public 
institutions for students and public funding, but privately managed and with significant autonomy in 
terms of their day-to-day activities and long-term choices. Since we believe these experiences provide 
some useful lessons for the ‘academies experiment’ in the UK, we briefly review some related 
evidence. 
Starting with the US, a number of studies have obtained causal estimates of the effect of charter 
schools by exploiting the fact that oversubscribed institutions use lotteries to allocate places, therefore 
by-passing the problem of selection of different pupils into charter schools.
8
 One of the earliest 
7
 More details about our regressions are provided in the note to the table. 
8
Note that there are also a number of studies not based on lotteries. For example, using propensity score 
matching, CREDO (2009) shows that charter schools are no better (or worse) than neighbouring traditional 
public schools. However, results from non-experimental methods are prone to biases due to students’ selection 
into schools; see discussion in Hoxby and Murarka (2007). 
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studies by Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) focuses on the impact of the Boston charter schools on pupil 
attainments. The authors find significant improvement in pupils’ test scores both in middle and high 
schools, and for both English and Mathematics – with the latter improving more. Interestingly, the 
authors also show that pupils in the tail – i.e. those with particularly low attainments before enrolling 
at a charter school – benefit the most. Similarly, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) find positive and 
significant effects of charter school attendance for students ‘lotteried in’ the New York City charter 
schools. The authors’ findings show that, for both reading and mathematics, these beneficial effects 
increase for each additional year spent at a charter school between 3
rd
 and 8
th
 grade. The authors also 
find that these effects are remarkably similar for boys and girls, and for students of Black and 
Hispanic origins, suggesting that students in the tail might benefit from charter school attendance. A 
related study by Dobbie and Fryer (2009) investigates the educational attainments of children enrolled 
at charter schools associated with the Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ) initiative in New York. The 
authors find that attendance at an HCZ school significantly increases pupils’ achievement, with 
sizeable improvements in English and mathematics for both primary and secondary school students. 
The authors also show that the programme benefits pupils of all abilities, which attained roughly 
similar benefits from attending HCZ charters. Finally, Angrist et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of a 
group of charter schools in Lynn (Massachusetts) managed by the Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP). These charter institutions specifically aim at improving achievements of low income students 
that qualify for free school meals and were set-up by teachers who qualified through the Teach for 
America programme. The authors find that pupils enrolled at KIPP schools between grade five and 
eight experience sizeable improvements in their English and mathematics achievements. Importantly, 
they find that these benefits are particularly strong for pupils with special education needs, lower prior 
attainments and poor command on English. Stated differently, the benefits of attending a KIPP school 
are stronger for pupils in the tail. 
It should be noted that none of these studies can properly investigate whether charter schools 
have more selected intake composition, since the allocation of places at over-subscribed schools is 
done by lotteries. However, most of these charter schools tend to cater very disadvantaged (and 
mainly ethnic-minority) urban students and thus predominantly enrol students in the bottom tail of the 
achievement distribution. For example, Hoxby and Muraka (2009) report that the New York City 
schools they analyse locate in very deprived areas and attract students who are substantially poorer 
than those at an average public school in New York City.  
Regarding the Swedish experience, a number of studies have investigated the competition effects 
exerted by the introduction of independent free-schools on either state school performance or on 
aggregate achievements at the municipality level. These studies include Ahlin (2003), Björklund et al. 
(2005), and Sandström and Bergström (2005), with results ranging from statistically insignificant 
estimates to very large effects. However, the early version of the work by Bohlmark and Lindahl 
(2007) is the only study that carefully decomposes whether any improvement in attainments at the 
11 
municipal level can be explained by state schools responding to the free-school competitive threat by 
raising standards, or by free-schools being more effective and expanding their market shares. The 
authors show that the former channel explains most of the improvements in overall achievements, but 
also provide some evidence that free-schools – with their more autonomous structures – are more 
effective at educating children. Note that this effect is small – especially compared to the results found 
for the US charter schools – at approximately 1 percentile or 4% of a standard deviation, and that 
Bohlmark and Lindahl (2007) do not report whether these results are stronger for weaker pupils with 
more disadvantaged background. Finally, the authors investigate whether the increased availability of 
private schools in the municipality has worsened school level segregation along the lines of parental 
income, education and immigration status. Their results show that more private schools tend to 
‘siphon away’ from public schools children whose parents have higher education levels and who are 
not first-generation immigrants. This suggests that Swedish free-schools tend to enrol pupils not 
coming from the bottom tail of the ability distribution. 
Concluding remarks 
The notion that different school structures can be a route to deliver improved educational performance 
has become a popular one. Indeed, reforms to school structures – and their autonomy and governance 
– have been a feature of recent education policies in countries like England, Sweden and the United
States. But does autonomy work? And does it offer scope to improve the lot of disadvantaged students 
in the lower tail of the education distribution? 
Our conclusion is probably not, or at least not in England and in the case of Labour's sponsored 
academies. Whilst there is a paucity of robust and coherent evidence to draw upon, it does not seem 
unreasonable to say that, on balance, the evidence that does exist at best shows only small beneficial 
effects on overall pupil performance and very little consistent evidence of improvements for tail 
students. Nevertheless, there are some success stories coming from the US, suggesting that, in some 
situations, autonomous schools can improve the performance of disadvantaged students, and narrow 
some of the most persistent educational disparities, such as the black-white achievement gap.  
What could explain the different performance of the US charters and UK academies? Although 
very speculative, one possible explanation rests with the details of the functioning of American 
charter schools. One of the defining features of these institutions is that they operate on the basis of a 
‘charter’, i.e. a performance contract granted for three to five, defining the school’s mission and goals, 
as well as the type of students it aims to attract. Charter schools are then held accountable to their 
sponsor (for example a local school board), which assesses whether these stated aims have been 
achieved and – if not – eventually revokes the charter. As of 2012, approximately 15% of all charter 
schools closed because they failed to achieve their goals. This generates sharp incentives for these 
schools to ‘perform’ and achieve their contractual aims. Since the majority of charter schools serve 
impoverished urban areas with the specific aim of improving the attainment of disadvantaged pupils – 
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and is held accountable for their improvements – it is not surprising that these institutions have been 
effective at educating the ‘tail’. 
On the other hand, English academies cater a mix of students of different abilities, and are held 
accountable on the basis of the same performance tables used by other schools in the country. These 
tend to focus schools’ attention on final attainments – such as the proportion of student achieving 5 
A*-C GCSEs – rather than measures of educational progression – such as contextual value-added. As 
discussed above and elsewhere in this book (see the chapter by Dale Basset), this has the potential to 
distort schools incentives towards coaching students most likely to perform well in the national exams 
in order maximise school ratings, and neglect pupils at the bottom of the ability distribution. 
Unfortunately, the evidence we have collected seems to back this pessimistic intuition. 
In conclusion, it may be that in the longer run the best academies will flourish and spread their 
practices across the education market in a tide that lifts all boats and so raises the achievement of 
pupils of all abilities. However, in order to guarantee that these more autonomous institutions can 
make a difference for the tail, new ‘rules of the game’ should be designed to make sure that schools 
have incentives to focus on the most disadvantaged student and, at the same time, are held 
accountable for their improvements.  
13 
References 
Abdulkadiroglu, A., J. Angrist, S. Dynarski, T. Kane and P. Pathak (2009): “Accountability and 
Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots”, NBER Working 
Paper 15549. 
Ahlin, Å (2003): “Does school competition matter? Effects of a Large-scale School Choice Reform on 
Student Performance”, Working Paper 2003:2, Department of Economics, Uppsala 
University. 
Angrist, J., S. Dynarski, T. Kane, P. Pathak, and C. Walters (2010): “Who Benefits fromCharter 
Schools? Evidence from KIPP Lynn”, NBER Working Paper 15740. 
Björklund, A, M. Clark, P.-A.Edin, P. Fredriksson, and A. Krueger (2005)” “The market comes to 
education in Sweden: An evaluation of Sweden’s surprising school reforms”, Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York. 
Böhlmark, A and M. Lindahl (2007): “The Impact of School Choice on Pupil Achievement, 
Segregation and Costs: Swedish Evidence”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2786. 
Bradley, S., R. Crouchley, J. Millington, and J. Taylor (2000): “Testing for Quasi-Market Forces in 
Secondary Education”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 62(3), 357-90. 
Bradley, S. and J. Taylor (2002): “The effect of the quasi-market on the efficiency-equity trade-off in 
the secondary school sector”, Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 54, 295-314. 
Burgess, S., A. Briggs, B. McConnell and H. Slater (2006): “School choice in England: Background 
Facts”, CMPO Working Paper 06/159. 
Burgess, S., B. McConnell, C. Propper, D. Wilson (2004): “Sorting and Choice in English Secondary 
Schools”, CMPO Working Paper 04/111. 
Burgess, S., C. Propper, H. Slater and D. Wilson (2005): “Who Wins and Who Loses from School 
Accountability? The Distribution of Educational Gains in English Secondary Schools”, 
CMPO Working Paper 05/128. 
Burgess, S., D. Wilson, and J. Worth (2010): “A natural experiment in school accountability: the 
impact of school performance information on pupil progress and sorting”, CMPO Working 
Paper 10/246. 
Clark, D. (2009): “Politics, Markets and Schools: Quasi-Experimental Estimates of the Impact of 
Autonomy and Competition from a Truly Revolutionary U.K. Reform”, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 117(4), 745-783. 
CREDO (2009):“Multiple Choice: Charter Performance in Sixteen States”, Center for Research on 
Education Outcomes, Stanford University. 
Dobbie, W. and R. Fryer (2009): “Are High Quality Schools Enough to Close the Achievement Gap? 
Evidence From a Social Experiment in Harlem”, NBER Working Paper 15473. 
Gibbons, S., S. Machin and O. Silva (2008):“Choice, Competition and Pupil Achievement”, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, vol. 6(4), 912-47. 
Gibbons, S. and O. Silva (2006a): “Competition and Accessibility in School Markets: Empirical 
Analysis Using Boundary Discontinuities”, in T.J. Gronberg and D.W. Jansen (eds.), 
IMPROVING SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECK-UPS OR CHOICE?, Advances in Applied 
Microeconomics, Vol.14, Elsevier. 
Gibbons, S. and O. Silva (2008b): “Urban Density and Pupil Achievement”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, vol. 63(1), 631-650. 
Gibbons, S. and O. Silva (2011): “Faith Primary Schools: Better Schools or Better Pupils?”, Journal 
of Labor Economics, vol. 29(3), 589-635. 
14 
 
Glennerster, H. (1991): “Quasi-Markets for Education”, Economic Journal, vol. 101, 1268-1276. 
Goldstein, H. and P. Noden (2003): “Modelling social segregation”, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 
29(2), 225-237. 
Gorard, S., C. Taylor and J. Fitz (2003): Schools, Markets and Choice Policies, Routledge Farmer, 
London. 
Hanushek, E. (2003): “The Failure of Input-Based Policies”, Economic Journal, vol. 113, F64-F98. 
Hoxby, C. (2004): “School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States”, 
Swedish Economic Policy Review, vol. 10(2), 9-65. 
Hoxby, C. and S. Murarka (2007):“Methods of Assessing Achievement of Students in Charter 
Schools”, in M. Behrens (eds.), CHARTER SCHOOL OUTCOMES, The Analytic Press, 
NewYork. 
Hoxby, C. and S. Murarka (2009):“Charter Schools in New York City: Who Enrolls and How They 
Affect Student Achievement”, NBER Working Paper 14852. 
Lazear, E. (2006): “Speeding, Tax Fraud and Teaching to the Test”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 121(3), 1029-1061.  
Le Grand, J. (1991): Equity and choice, London, Harper Collins. 
Le Grand, J. (1993): Quasi-markets and social policy, London, Macmillan. 
Levacic, R. (2004): “Competition and the Performance of English Secondary Schools: Further 
Evidence”, Education Economics, vol. 12(2), 177-93. 
Machin, S and J. Vernoit (2011): “Changing School Autonomy: Academy Schools and Their 
Introduction to England’s Education”, CEE Discussion Paper 123. 
Machin, S. and A. Vignoles (2005): What’s the Good of Education?, Princeton University Press. 
Machin, S. and J. Wilson (2008): “Public and Private Schooling Initiatives in England: The Case of 
City Academies”, in R. Chakrabarti and P. Peterson (eds.),SCHOOL CHOICE INTERNATIONAL, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008): “Academies Evaluation Fifth Annual Report”, Annesley, 
Department for Children, School and Families (DCSF) Publications. 
Sandström, M. and Bergström, F. (2005): “School Vouchers in Practice: Competition Will Not Hurt 
You”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, 351-380. 
Tiebout, C. (1956): “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 64(5), 
416-424. 
Wilson, J (2011):“Are England’s Academies More Inclusive or More ‘Exclusive’? The Impact of 
Institutional Change on thePupil Profile of Schools”, CEE Discussion Paper 125. 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 1: Academies and GCSE Performance –  
The Effect of Academy Conversion on Pupils of Different Abilities 
 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the fraction of pupils obtaining at least 5 A*-C GCSE, and the bars show the 
effect of early and late academy conversions expressed as a fraction of the across-school variation (standard 
deviation) in the percentage of pupils achieving 5 A*-C GCSE. Pupils are ranked by their KS2 total score within 
their secondary school in the top panel (e.g. the bottom 10% at the school) and in the national distribution in the 
bottom panel (e.g. the bottom 10% nation-wide). For details about the regression method and specification see 
notes to Appendix Table 1. Early academies are those converting before 2006/2007. Full bar represents 
significant effects (10% significance or better), shaded bars represent non-significant effects. 
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Appendix Table 1: Academies and GCSE Performance – The Effect of Academy Conversion on Pupils of Different Abilities 
Pupil KS2 between:  Bottom10 pctiles Bottom 20 pctiles 20
th
-50
th
 pctile 50
th
-80
th
pctile Top 20 pctiles Top 10 pctiles 
        
Panel A: Pupils ranked by percentile within school distribution  
        
Early Academies, Stand. Effect  0.032 
(0.076) 
0.047 
(0.072) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
0.190 
(0.091)* 
0.323 
(0.175)* 
0.310 
(0.228) 
Late Academies, Stand. Effect  0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.005 
(0.037) 
-0.061 
(0.057) 
0.012 
(0.086) 
-0.096 
(0.142) 
-0.091 
(0.166) 
        
Panel B: Pupils ranked by percentile within national distribution  
        
Early Academies, Stand. Effect  0.052 
(0.135) 
0.024 
(0.082) 
0.149 
(0.102) 
0.257 
(0.161) 
0.159 
(0.274) 
0.084 
(0.280) 
Late Academies, Stand. Effect  -0.100 
(0.061) 
-0.033 
(0.052) 
-0.035 
(0.089) 
-0.140 
(0.142) 
-0.157 
(0.233) 
0.132 
(0.197) 
        
Note: The dependent variable is the fraction of pupils obtaining at least 5 A*-C GCSE. Pupils are ranked by their KS2 total score within their secondary school in Panel A 
(e.g. the bottom 10% at the school) and in the national distribution in Panel B (e.g. the bottom 10% nation-wide). Regressions include school fixed effects, year dummies, 
KS2 of pupils taking their KS4 exams and the following controls: proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals; proportion of pupils taking free school meals; proportion 
of pupils of White ethnic origin; pupil to qualified teachers ratio; proportion of pupils with special education needs, with statements; proportion of pupils with special 
education needs, without statements. Number of observations: 1560. Early academies are those converting before 2006/2007. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the 
school level. *=10% significance or better. 
 
 
